A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work

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On présente dans cet article une théorie des catégories de valeurs à partir desquelles les cultures peuvent être comparées; cette théorie est validée grâce à des données en provenance de 49 pays du monde entier. Sept catégories de valeurs ont été identifiées et réparties sur trois dimensions bipolaires: Conservatisme opposé à Autonomie intellectuelle et affective, Hiérarchie opposée à Egalitarisme, Domination opposée à Harmonie. Les pays sont situés dans un espace bidimensionnel en fonction de leurs valeurs fondamentales, faisant apparaître des regroupements culturellement significatifs. Les analyses portent sur des échantillons d'enseignants et d'étudiants. On explicite l'impact de la différenciation des valeurs culturelles selon les pays sur les différences de signification du travail. Afin de stimuler la recherche sur le travail et les valeurs culturelles, on énonce des hypothèses concernant les principaux aspects des valeurs culturelles qui sont particulièrement compatibles ou en contradiction avec la centralité du travail, avec diverses normes de société touchant le travail, et avec la poursuite de quatre types de valeurs ou buts professionnels.

A theory of the types of values on which cultures can be compared is presented and validated with data from 49 nations from around the world. Seven types of values are identified, structured along three polar dimensions: Conservatism versus Intellectual and Affective Autonomy; Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism; and Mastery versus Harmony. Based on their cultural value priorities, nations

are arrayed in a two-dimensional space, revealing meaningful groupings of culturally related nations. Analyses replicate with both teacher and student samples. Implications of national differences in cultural values for differences in meaning of work are explicated. To stimulate research on cultural values and work, hypotheses are developed regarding the cultural value emphases that are especially compatible or conflicting with work centrality, with different societal norms about work, and with the pursuit of four types of work values or goals.

INTRODUCTION

How is the meaning of work in the life of individuals influenced by prevailing cultural value priorities? To answer this question requires a theory of the value dimensions on which national cultures can be compared. It also requires reliable methods to measure the locations of nations along these dimensions. In this paper, I summarise such a theory, validate its propositions empirically, and array 49 nations on the dimensions identified. I then suggest some implications of cultural values for work centrality, societal norms about work, and work goals in different societies. These suggestions illustrate how cultural values can be used to generate hypotheses about work-related variables.

For an understanding of how cultural values influence the meanings that members of different societies attribute to work, culture-level value dimensions rather than individual-level dimensions are appropriate. Smith and Schwartz (1997) have explicated the difference between individual- and culture-level value dimensions. The appropriate unit of analysis for assessing the validity of culture-level dimensions is the society or cultural group, not the individual person (Hofstede, 1980, 1990; Schwartz, 1994b). Possible impacts of individual differences in value priorities on the meanings and importance that different individuals within a society attribute to work values are discussed elsewhere (Ros, Schwartz, & Surkis, this issue). When studying individual differences, an individual-level theory of values, different from the theory explicated here, must be used.

Current theories of cultural values (e.g. Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Triandis, 1990) address limited aspects of culture (e.g. materialism–postmaterialism; individualism–collectivism) rather than seeking to capture a full range of potentially relevant value dimensions. Empirical work with these theories has used instruments not validated for cross-cultural equivalence of meaning. And even the most comprehensive study (Hofstede, 1990) lacks data from important regions of the world (e.g. the former Eastern bloc). The theory and research discussed here are intended to overcome these limitations.

I define values as conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organisational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and

evaluations (cf. Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). In this view, values are trans-situational criteria or goals (e.g. security, hedonism), ordered by importance as guiding principles in life.

Cultural values represent the implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society (Williams, 1970). These cultural values (e.g. freedom, prosperity, security) are the bases for the specific norms that tell people what is appropriate in various situations. The ways that societal institutions (e.g. the family, education, economic, political, religious systems) function, their goals and their modes of operation, express cultural value priorities. For example, in societies where individual ambition and success are highly valued, the organisation of the economic and legal systems is likely to be competitive (e.g. capitalist markets and adversarial legal proceedings). In contrast, a cultural emphasis on group well-being is likely to be expressed in more cooperative economic and legal systems (e.g. socialism and mediation).

Because cultural value priorities are shared, role incumbents in social institutions (e.g. leaders in governments, teachers in schools, executive officers of corporations) can draw on them to select socially appropriate behaviour and to justify their behavioural choices to others (e.g. to go to war, to punish a child, to fire employees). The explicit and implicit value emphases that characterise a culture are imparted to societal members through everyday exposure to customs, laws, norms, scripts, and organisational practices that are shaped by and express the prevailing cultural values (Bourdieu, 1972; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Thus, adaptation to social reality and informal socialisation are just as central to the transmission of cultural values as is formal socialisation.

I focus here on the cultures of national groups. National boundaries do not necessarily correspond to the boundaries of organically developed, relatively homogeneous societies with a shared culture. But there are strong forces towards integration that can produce substantial sharing of culture in nations that have existed for some time (Hofstede, 1990). There is usually a single dominant language, educational system, army, and political system, and shared mass media, markets, services and national symbols (e.g. flags, sports teams). This is less the case, of course, in nations where ethnic or other groups form distinctive cultural groups that live separate and substantially different lives. The descriptions of national culture presented here for such heterogeneous nations refer largely to the value culture of the dominant, majority group.

Like many others, I too infer the value priorities that characterise a society by aggregating the value priorities of individuals (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Morris, 1956). Individual value priorities are a product both of shared culture and of unique personal experience. Shared cultural values in a society help to shape the contingencies to which people

must adapt in the institutions in which they spend their time. As a result, the members of each cultural group share many value-relevant experiences and they are socialised to accept shared social values. Of course, within cultural groups there is individual variation in value priorities due to the unique experiences and personalities of different individuals. However, the average priorities attributed to different values by societal members reflect the central thrust of their shared enculturation. Hence the average priorities point to the underlying, common cultural values.[1]

Following several theorists (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973), I postulate that cultural dimensions of values reflect the basic issues or problems that societies must confront in order to regulate human activity. Societal members, especially decision-makers, recognise and communicate about these problems, plan responses to them, and motivate one another to cope with them. Values (e.g. success, justice, freedom, social order, tradition) are the vocabulary of socially approved goals used to motivate action, and to express and justify the solutions chosen.

OUTLINE OF THE THEORY

Seven Value Types

The theory presented here derives seven types of values on which cultures can be compared by considering three issues that confront all societies. The theory also specifies the dimensional structure of relations among these types of values.[2]

Issue I. The first basic issue confronting all societies is to define the nature of the relation between the individual and the group. A large literature suggests that resolutions of this issue give rise to the most critical cultural dimension. This dimension is frequently labelled individualism–collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Kim et al., 1994). It is also described as contrasting individualism–communalism, independence–interdependence, autonomy–relatedness, and separateness–interdependence (e.g. Bellah et al., 1985; Doi, 1986; Geertz, 1984; Hsu, 1983; Kagitcibasi, 1990; Markus &

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[1] Liska (1990) clarifies how the properties of societies and other collectivities measured by aggregate variables, such as mean national levels of value importance, reflect the dynamics of social interaction and organisation of social units no less well than such structural variables as communication networks or such global products as laws.

[2] For an earlier version of the theory, with a fuller and somewhat different derivation of the value types, see Schwartz (1994b). See Schwartz and Ros (1995) for an application of the theory that analyses cultural differences between Western Europe, the United States, and the Far East, and Schwartz and Bardi (1997) for an application that analyses the impact of communist rule on values in Eastern Europe.

Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1982; Sinha, 1990). These contrasts include two major themes: (1) Whose interests should take precedence, the individual's or the group's? (2) To what extent are persons autonomous vs. embedded in their groups? I consider the second theme more fundamental because, to the extent that persons are truly embedded in their groups, conflict of interest is not experienced.

One pole of this dimension describes cultures in which the person is viewed as an entity who is embedded in the collectivity and finds meaning in life largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group and participating in its shared way of life. This outlook is expressed, maintained, and justified by a set of values that we label the Conservatism value type. Its capsule definition follows, with exemplary specific values in parentheses. *Conservatism:* A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary group or the traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom).

The opposite pole of this dimension describes cultures in which the person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness, who seeks to express his or her own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings, motives) and is encouraged to do so. I label the value type appropriate to this view Autonomy. It is possible to distinguish conceptually between two types of Autonomy, the first refers to ideas and thought, the second to feelings and emotions. *Intellectual Autonomy:* A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity). *Affective Autonomy:* A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience (pleasure, exciting life, varied life).

Issue II.   The second basic issue that confronts all societies is to guarantee responsible behaviour that will preserve the social fabric. People must be induced to consider the welfare of others, coordinate with them, and thereby manage the unavoidable social interdependencies. One polar resolution of this issue uses power differences, relying on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to ensure socially responsible behaviour. People are socialised and sanctioned to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. The value type expressive of this view is *Hierarchy:* A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth).[3]

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[3] Note that the single values include both humility and social power. These two values go together at the level of cultures because, in a society organised around the legitimacy of hierarchy, members must accept that they are inferior to some as well as superior to others.

An alternative solution to the problem of responsible social behaviour is to induce societal members to recognise one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialised to internalise a commitment to voluntary cooperation with others and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. The value type expressive of this solution is *Egalitarianism:* A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favour of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty).

Issue III.   The third basic issue that confronts all societies is the relation of humankind to the natural and social world. One response is actively to master and change the world, to assert control, bend it to our will, and exploit it in order to further personal or group interests. The value type expressive of this orientation is *Mastery:* A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence). An opposing resolution of this issue is to accept the world as it is, trying to fit in rather than to change or exploit it. The value type expressive of this response is *Harmony:* A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty).[4]

The Structure of Value Relations

According to theory, the seven value types are postulated to form three bipolar dimensions that express the contradictions between the alternative resolutions to each of the three issues just described: Autonomy versus Conservatism, Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism, Mastery versus Harmony.

Across individual persons within samples, in contrast, these two values are negatively related. People who give high priority to humility tend to give low priority to social power and vice versa. For individuals, the simultaneous pursuit of humility and of social power are typically contradictory. The different relations between this pair of values at the two levels of analysis exemplifies how culture-level and individual-level analyses may yield different value dimensions. The single values wisdom and broadmindedness provide another example. At the culture level, they express opposing value types, Conservatism and Intellectual Autonomy, respectively. Societies that value preservation of the status quo emphasise wisdom as an expression of traditional knowledge. Societies that value intellectual independence emphasise broadmindedness as a way to foster innovative and different ideas. At the individual level, in contrast, these two values are positively correlated. People tend to give either high priority or low priority to both because both emphasise guiding one's behaviour by thoughtful consideration.

    [4] The definition of Harmony and the exemplary values refer to the natural world. It may, however, be more appropriate to conceptualise this value type as referring to non-assertiveness in social relations as well. A third potential response to this issue suggested by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), submission to the environment, is uncommon in contemporary national cultures.

Because of these contradictions, an emphasis on one value type is postulated to be accompanied in a culture by a de-emphasis on the polar type. The value types are also interrelated on the basis of the compatibilities among them. That is, certain value types share similar assumptions that make it possible for them to be emphasised simultaneously in a particular culture. These dynamic relations of contradiction and compatibility among the seven cultural value types are postulated to lead to the integrated structure of cultural value systems shown in Fig. 1.

In this figure, pairs of value types that are in opposition emanate in opposing directions from the centre; pairs of value types that are compatible are located in proximity going around the circle. The theorised bases for the compatibilities among value types that organise the value dimensions into the order shown in Fig. 1 are briefly noted next.

Hierarchy and Conservatism values relate positively because a view of the social actor (individual or group) as embedded in a collectivity of interdependent, mutually obligated others underlies them both. Egalitarianism and Autonomy values relate positively because a view of the social actor as an autonomous entity underlies them both. The Intellectual subset of values is more related to Egalitarianism than the Affective Autonomy subset. This is because it is critical to view social actors as autonomous decision makers who can choose to undertake social


FIG. 1.   Theorised structure of culture-level value types.

responsibilities if one is to accept the nature of human relationships as contractual, the assumption implicit in Egalitarianism.

Mastery values relate positively to Autonomy values, because both types presume the legitimacy of changing the status quo and they both emphasise stimulating activity. However, the interests whose assertive and even exploitative pursuit are justified by Mastery values are not necessarily those of the autonomous self or other individual actor. They may equally be the shared interests of the collectivities in which one is embedded (e.g. tribe, family, work group). Hence Mastery values do not necessarily oppose Conservatism values. Mastery values are also linked to Hierarchy values, because efforts to get ahead are often at the expense of others and result in unequal allocations of roles and resources that are justified in a society where hierarchical differences are viewed as legitimate. But Mastery values are opposed to Egalitarianism values, because exploitative self-assertion (for individual or group interests) conflicts with relating to others as equals.

Harmony values are compatible with Conservatism values, with which they share an emphasis on avoiding change, and with Egalitarianism values, with which they share an emphasis on cooperative relations. Their position in the overall structure also reflects the contradiction implicit in a simultaneous cultural emphasis on the quiescent concord with the world inherent in Harmony values and the legitimation of arousing experience inherent in Affective Autonomy values.

VALIDATION OF THE THEORY

Respondents from every inhabited continent completed the Schwartz (1992) value survey anonymously in their native language. They rated the importance of 56 single values "as guiding principles in MY life". Each value was followed in parentheses by a short explanatory phrase (e.g. WEALTH [material possessions, money]).[5] Responses ranged from 7 (of supreme importance) to 3 (important) to 0 (not important) to −1 (opposed to my values). Only values that have relatively equivalent meanings to respondents across cultures may legitimately be used for cross-cultural comparison. Examination of separate multidimensional scaling analyses of the 56 values within each of the different nations had established such equivalence for 45 of the values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). Only these 45 values were therefore included in the analyses for testing cultural dimensions. These values appear in Fig. 2.

In order to test the validity of the theoretical content and structure of culture-level value types, a Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA; Borg & Lingoes, 1987; Guttman, 1968) was performed on data from over 35,000

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[5] A listing of all 56 values with their explanatory phrases is found in Schwartz (1992).

FIG. 2. Culture-level SSA—122 samples (49 nations).

EGALITARIANISM

INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY

AFFECTIVE AUTONOMY

HARMONY

UNITY WITH NATURE*
PROTECT ENVIRONMENT*

*WORLD OF
BEAUTY

SOCIAL*JUSTICE
*HONEST

*HELPFUL

*RESPONSIBLE

*WORLD OF PEACE

*FREEDOM

*CREATIVITY

BROADMINDED*
CURIOUS*

*VARIED LIFE
*EXCITING LIFE

*PLEASURE

*ENJOYING
LIFE

ACCEPT PORTION
*IN LIFE

EQUALITY*

LOYAL*

CONSERVATISM

*FAMILY
SECURITY

RESPECT FOR
TRADITION*

SOCIAL
ORDER*
*CLEAN
MODERATE FORGIVING
HONOR *POLITENESS
* ELDERS* *PROTECTING PUBLIC
NATIONAL IMAGE *OBEDIENT
SECURITY WISDOM*
RECIPROCA-* *DEVOUT
TION OF FAVORS *SELF-
DISCIPLINE

HUMBLE*

AUTHORITY*

INFLUENTIAL*

WEALTH*
SOCIAL*POWER

HIERARCHY

*SUCCESS-
FUL

*AMBITIOUS

CAPABLE

CHOOSING*
OWN GOALS

*INDEPENDENT

MASTERY

DARING*

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respondents from 122 samples in 49 nations, gathered between 1988 and 1993 (see Table 1).

For each of the 122 samples, the mean importance of each of the 45 values was calculated. Then correlations between the mean importance of each pair of values across the samples were computed. Because the analysis uses means of samples that represent cultures rather than ratings of values by individual respondents, the analysis yields culture-level rather than individual-level dimensions (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994b). Covariation in the importance of different values across individuals determines the individual-level dimensions that are found within samples; but this covariation does not influence the mean importance rating of each value in the sample. It is covariation in these mean importance ratings across samples that determines the culture-level value dimensions. Hence, statistically, the two levels of analysis are independent.

The SSA in Fig. 2 portrays the pattern of intercorrelations among values, based on sample means, across all the samples. Each value is represented by a point such that the more positive the intercorrelation between any pair of values the closer they are in the space, and the less positive their intercorrelation the more distant.[6] As can readily be seen by comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 1, the observed content and structure of value types fully supports the theorised content and structure. Values in close proximity form wedge-shaped regions that emanate from the centre of the circle and that represent each value type. The specific single values selected *a priori* to represent each value type are located within a unique region of the space. Based on these results, there is empirical justification for using the culture-level value types in the theory to compare national cultures.

COMPARING NATIONAL CULTURES

Data for comparing nations might ideally be obtained from representative national samples. Even with such samples, however, inferences about national culture require caution. National populations differ in their demographic composition (e.g. distributions of age, education, occupation), and these different distributions affect average value priorities. The values of particular demographic groups (e.g. the elderly) are influenced not only by the prevailing culture, but by the unique experiences to which these groups are exposed by virtue of their social locations. Observed differences between the mean values of representative national samples reflect, therefore, not only the prevailing culture, but also current differences in the

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[6] The correlation matrix on which the SSA is based and the coordinates of each value in the two-dimensional space are available from the author.

TABLE 1
Characteristics of Samples

Nation	Group	N
Argentina	Adol	676
Australia	Stud	387
	Teac	138
	Adul	199
	Adol	421
Belgium	Stud	259
Bolivia	Teac	110
Brazil	Stud	154
	Teac	244
	Adul	154
Bulgaria	Teac	196
	Stud	179
(Turk eth)	Teac	181
	Stud	280
Canada	Teac	115
	Stud	184
(French)	Teac	194
	Stud	199
China	Teac	211
	Stud	205
	Wrkr	208
	Adol	1839
Cyprus (Gk)	Teac	140
	Stud	142
Czech	Teac	200
Denmark	Teac	170
	Stud	194
England	Stud	158
Estonia	Teac	230
	Teac	189
	Stud	94
Estonia	Adul	259
	Adol	148
	Wrkr	225
Fiji	Stud	76
	Teac	204
Finland	Stud	296
	Natl	1868
France	Stud	205
	Teac	159
	Adul	360
Georgia	Teac	200
	Stud	206
Germany (E)	Teac	202
	Stud	226
Germany (W)	Teac	187
	Stud	377
Greece	Teac	195
	Stud	234
Hong Kong	Teac	201
	Stud	211
Hungary	Teac	141
	Stud	166
India	Teac	197
	Stud	200
Indonesia	Stud	263
Israel (Jw)	Teac	213
	Stud	197
	Natl	227
	Kibbutz	365
	ReligAdol-Natl	1743
	SeculAdol-Natl	3802
Israel (Mus)	Teac	139
(Chr)	Teac	89
(Drz)	Teac	123
Italy	Teac	200
	Stud	199
Japan	Stud	158
	Teac	229
	Stud	542
	Stud	266
	Stud	279
	OsakaRep	207
	TokyoRep	534
Japan-Amer	3rdGnrt	558
	4thGnrt	158
Malaysia	Teac	151
	Stud	210
Mexico	Teac	315
	Stud	485
Nepal	Teac	257
	Stud	199
Netherlands	Teac	187
	Stud	278
New Zealand	Natl	240
	Teac	199
	Stud	202
Poland	Teac	195
	Stud	195
Portugal	Teac	192
	Stud	198
Russia	Researcher	395
	Teac	216
Singapore	Teac	183
	Stud	388
Slovakia	Teac	189
	RuralTeac	173
	Stud	208
Slovenia	Teac	199
	Stud	214
Sth Africa	CityAdul	309
	Stud	219
Sth Korea	Teac	186
	Stud	308
Spain	Stud	187
	Teac	211
Sweden	Teac	89
	Stud	112
Switzerland	Teac	202
	Teac	141
Taiwan	Teac	183
	Teac	183
Thailand	Teac	261
	Stud	238
Turkey	Stud	234
	Stud	252
USA	Stud	136
	CounsPsychs	457
Venezuela	Stud	185
	Teac	117
Zimbabwe	Teac	186
	Stud	205

demographic composition of national populations.[7] Consequently, even when comparing the values of representative national samples, it would still be necessary to control for demographic differences between nations before we could confidently ascribe observed differences in value priorities to national culture alone. Moreover, as noted earlier, many nations contain more than one sub-cultural group, so a single characterisation based on a representative national sample is still misleading.

Our approach, instead, was to obtain samples largely from the dominant cultural group in each nation, samples matched on critical characteristics. The focal type of sample we studied was urban school teachers who teach the full range of subjects in grades 3–12 of the most common type of school system in each of 44 nations. No single occupational group represents a culture, but school teachers may have a number of advantages for characterising national value priorities. As a group, they play an explicit role in value socialisation, they are presumably key carriers of culture, and they probably reflect the mid-range of prevailing value priorities in most societies. By focusing on this single matched group, we obtain a relatively pure representation of national differences in value priorities, net of the influences of other national differences.

To test the robustness of conclusions from the teacher samples, parallel analyses were performed with data from samples of college students, from a wide variety of majors, in each of 40 nations. The mean value ratings observed for teacher and for student samples in each nation are almost certainly not the same as the ratings that would be obtained from other types of samples or from a representative sample. I assume, however, that the *order* of countries on the value means, using these matched samples, is reasonably similar to the *order* one would obtain using other types of samples to represent these nations.

To compute the mean importance of a value type in a nation, we averaged the importance that members of the sample from that nation attributed to the set of values that represent that type. These are the values that appear together in the region of each culture-level value type in Fig. 2.[8] For example, the mean importance of Hierarchy is the average of the ratings of authority, wealth, social power, influential, and humble; the mean importance of Affective Autonomy is the average of the ratings of varied life, exciting life, pleasure, and enjoying life. For cross-national comparisons, sample differences in scale use were eliminated by standardising the mean

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[7] In the long term, of course, differences in the distributions of demographic characteristics are one factor among others (e.g., historical events, religions) that gradually give rise to national cultures.

[8] One value, accepting my portion in life, was not included in the analyses because its location was not robust across analyses of different subsets of samples and because its meaning did not fit conceptually with its location in the Egalitarianism region.

importance of all seven value types within each sample around the approximate international mean of 4.00.

National cultures might be compared in terms of the relative importance ascribed to each value type taken alone (e.g. Schwartz, 1994b). However, because the value types form an integrated structure, it is possible to compare the similarity of national cultures on the whole profile of their seven value priorities without losing much of the information about single value types. The coplot technique, developed by Adi Raveh (Goldreich & Raveh, 1993) is ideal for this purpose. This technique provides a graphic representation of the similarities and differences among samples on all seven value types, simultaneously, in a two-dimensional space. It also places seven vectors in the space that indicate the order of the samples on each of the seven value types. As will be illustrated, locations of the samples along these vectors relative to one another enable us to ascertain, from the graphic representation, the specific ways in which any national sample resembles or differs from any other.

The coplot technique computes a profile difference score for each pair of samples. Specifically, it sums the absolute differences between the standardised ratings that each of the two samples give to each of the seven value types. In this way, it produces a matrix of profile differences between all pairs of samples. This matrix is then used to locate the samples in a two-dimensional space. The distances among the samples in the space reflect the profile similarity or dissimilarity among the samples. Figure 3 presents the coplot results for teacher samples from 44 national cultures.[9]

The placement of the name of each value type on the figure indicates the direction of increasing importance of that value type relative to the centre of the two-dimensional space (located just above Australia). Imagine a directional line drawn through the centre to the small arrow adjacent to the name of each value type. (Such a line is drawn for Intellectual Autonomy in Fig. 3, extending from the lower left to the upper right.) These vector lines would be the regression lines computed to represent optimally the order of the samples on the importance they attribute to each value type.

For example, the farther towards the upper right that a national sample is located, the greater the importance that the sample attributes to Intellectual Autonomy values, relative to all other samples. And the farther towards the lower left, the less importance the sample attributes to Intellectual Autonomy values. The location of a sample on each value type can be found by drawing a perpendicular line from the position of the sample to the vector

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[9] Representing relations among a large number of samples in only two dimensions necessarily entails some inaccuracy. The coefficients of alienation were 0.13 for the analysis of 44 teacher samples and 0.14 for the analysis of 40 student samples. According to common standards, a coefficient of <.15 indicates good accuracy.

FIG. 3. Coplot: Teacher samples—44 nations, value types and cultural regions. Numbers in parentheses following a nation name indicate the number of separate samples from the nation averaged to compute scores.

for that value type. Such perpendiculars are drawn for four countries on the vector that is shown. They reveal that Intellectual Autonomy is quite important in West Germany, a little less important in Greece, rather unimportant in Poland, and very unimportant in Nepal.

Now consider how a single sample can be located on all seven value types. For example, the francophone Swiss sample attributed the most importance to Intellectual Autonomy values (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity) of all the samples studied. On the other hand, the Swiss, of all the samples, most rejected Conservatism values as unimportant. The location of the Swiss sample also indicates that it attributed relatively high importance to Affective Autonomy and to Egalitarianism values, but low importance to Hierarchy values. The importance of both Harmony and Mastery values was moderate for this sample. Thus, the coplot diagram in Fig. 3 portrays both the profile similarities and differences among national cultures and the dimensions of comparison.[10]

Sweden and Denmark, located very close in the space at the right centre of the figure, illustrate similar national value cultures. Their importance profiles on all seven value types are almost identical: very high Egalitarianism, Intellectual and Affective Autonomy, moderately high Harmony, moderately low Mastery, very low Hierarchy and Conservatism. In contrast, compare China (upper left) with Italy (lower right)—the (3) next to China signifies the fact that this is an average of three teacher samples from different regions of China (Hebei, Guangzhou, and Shanghai) which all have very similar profiles. China and Italy have virtually opposite profiles on all but Conservatism and Affective Autonomy.

The total set of 44 profiles suggests the existence of broad cultural groupings of nations. These groupings are related to geographical proximity, but they are based on shared histories, religion, level of development, culture contact, and other factors (see Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Schwartz & Ros, 1995). The dotted lines in Fig. 3 enclose regions that identify these groupings. Grouped together in separable regions are all the samples from the Western European nations, from the English-speaking nations, from the Far Eastern nations, from the East European nations, and from the Latin American nations. Islamic nations may also form a separable grouping. The coplot diagram identifies the value profiles that characterise these broad cultural groupings. The English-speaking nations tend to emphasise

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[10] Of course, the seven vectors do not represent the actual order of all samples on the value types with perfect accuracy. The accuracy of representation is measured by correlating the actual importance ratings that the samples gave to a value type with the order of the samples along the vector for that type. These correlations were above 0.75 for all value types, averaging 0.84 for the teacher analysis and .87 for the student analysis. Hence, the figure provides a reasonable overview of sample locations on each value type, but exact scores should be compared when precision is needed.

Mastery and Affective Autonomy values at the expense of Conservatism and Harmony values, for example, and the East European nations show the opposite set of emphases.

Before going further, it is desirable to evaluate the robustness of these findings. For this purpose, I examine the coplot findings for the set of university student samples from 40 different nations. This set of nations differs somewhat from those in the teacher study. Nine of the nations from the previous analysis are missing, and six new nations are included. So the challenge to replication comes both from using a different type of matched group to represent nations and from studying a partly different set of nations.

Figure 4 presents the coplot diagram for national cultures, represented by student samples. The seven value types are located in exactly the same directions relative to one another as in the teacher analysis. The rotation of the vectors in the space, compared with the teacher analysis (Fig. 3) is of no substantive significance. These results replicate the structure of the value types with a different type of sample. They lend further credence to the postulate that the structure of seven value types efficiently captures the relations among national cultures. Equally significant, the locations of nations and cultural regions on the vectors for the value types are almost the same as in Fig. 3. Thus, two independent sets of samples—teachers and students—yield almost identical mappings of world cultures. This finding lends considerable legitimacy to the claim that the approach adopted here accurately captures important aspects of cultural differences among nations and broader regions.

Once again, there is a Western European region that includes East Germany, an Eastern European region, and an English-speaking region. A Far Eastern region emerges in the same location, despite the replacement of Thailand and Taiwan in the teacher analysis by Fiji and South Korea in this analysis. Although only two Islamic nations were included—one of the four from the teacher analysis (Malaysia) and one new (Indonesia)—an Islamic region emerges. A Latin American region replicates in the centre, based only on two nations. Even the special locations of Japan, Israel, and the location of the one African country—Zimbabwe, are similar to those in the teacher analysis.

In sum, there is substantial support for the robustness of the cross-national structure of value profiles. I therefore propose that these value types and the dimensions they form can be utilised to predict and understand national differences on work-related issues. Research may proceed in two directions. In order to explain observed differences among nations in the organisation of work, in work ideologies, or in work practices, for example, these differences may be connected to national differences on one or more of the cultural value types. Alternatively, one may start with the cultural

FIG. 4.   Coplot: Student samples—40 nations, value types and cultural regions. Numbers in parentheses following a nation name indicate the number of separate samples from the nation averaged to compute scores.

value profiles of one or more nations and draw out the implications of the particular value cultures for work-related attitudes and behaviour.

CULTURAL VALUES AND WORK

This section proposes and discusses some implications of cultural values for three aspects of work: work centrality, societal norms about work, and work goals. My aim is to illustrate the application of my theory and the empirical data on cultural values to the study of work. I hope, thereby, to stimulate research using cultural values. For this purpose, I derive testable hypotheses in several different areas of research on work, and illustrate how these hypotheses may be investigated and supported or rejected, but I offer no definitive findings.

Work Centrality

The MOW International Research Team (1987) defined work centrality as the importance and significance of work in a person's total life. Their index of work centrality includes both a general question about the importance of work and a question about the importance of work relative to four other life areas—leisure, community, religion, and family.

The top panel in Table 2 lists the cultural value emphases that I hypothesise to be especially compatible or conflicting with the experience of work as central to one's life. Work is likely to be experienced as central to life more in societies where Mastery and Hierarchy values are important and less in societies where Affective Autonomy, Egalitarianism, Harmony, and Conservatism values are important. The derivation of the hypothesised relationships is as follows: Mastery values emphasise getting ahead through active self-assertion, through mastering and changing the natural and social environment. In most societies, the major legitimate arena for such assertive, controlling, exploitative activity is the world of work. Hierarchy values share with Mastery values the legitimation of allocating roles and resources differentially, and they justify actions to increase one's power and wealth within the system. Hence, a culture that emphasises Hierarchy values also encourages people to devote themselves to the world of work through which such goals can be attained.

The values listed as conflicting with the centrality of work promote the importance of one or more of the other four life areas with which work competes. Thus, pursuit of leisure is best legitimised by and is an important arena for expressing a cultural emphasis on Affective Autonomy values, investment in bettering the community follows from an emphasis on Egalitarianism values, and devotion to family and religion are required by an emphasis on Conservatism values. Harmony values, opposed conceptually and empirically to Mastery values, also conflict with viewing work as central

TABLE 2
Hypothesised Compatibility and Conⁱict of Culture Value Emphases with Dimensions of Work

Dimensions of Work	Cultural Value Emphases	
	Compatible	*Conflicting*
Work Centrality		
Contrasted with leisure, community, family, religion	Mastery Hierarchy	Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism Harmony Conservatism
Societal Norms about Working		
Entitlement vs. Obligation	Egalitarianism Intellectual Autonomy	Conservatism Hierarchy
Work Values		
Power	Hierarchy Mastery	Harmony Egalitarianism
Intrinsic	Intellectual Autonomy Affective Autonomy	Conservatism
Extrinsic	Conservatism Hierarchy	Intellectual Autonomy
Social	Egalitarianism Harmony	Hierarchy Mastery

to life: work generally aims to modify the material and social environment, whereas Harmony values emphasise accepting the world as it is.[11]

Published data for assessing whether this hypothesis has any plausibility are available from three countries. Based on representative national labour force samples in 1989/90, England and Quintanilla (1994) report that work was most central in Japan (7.34 on a 2–10 scale), next in the USA (6.63), and least in West Germany (6.04). These work centrality scores were compared with scores for the mean importance attributed to the cultural values hypothesised to be compatible with the centrality of work (Mastery and Hierarchy) minus those hypothesised to be incompatible (Affective Autonomy, Egalitarianism, Conservatism, and Harmony).[12]

The observed differences for Japan, USA, and Germany, respectively, were 1.52, 1.29, and 0.87, for teacher samples, and 1.51, 1.81, and 0.68 for student samples. The order of means fits expectations exactly for the teacher

[11] No prediction is offered for Intellectual Autonomy values. I postulate that their relation to the centrality of work in a society depends in part on the nature of work for most societal members. Across nations in which the vast majority of people work in jobs that frustrate the pursuit of independent thought and action (e.g. industrialising nations), the national level of Intellectual Autonomy should correlate negatively with work centrality. This association may be attenuated or even reversed as more and more people work in intellectually challenging, autonomous jobs (e.g. in post-industrial societies).

[12] To simplify presentation, a constant of 2 was added to these scores to make them positive.

samples. For the student samples, Germany showed the smallest difference, as expected, but the order for Japan and the USA was reversed. These results, yielding five of six comparisons in the expected order, suggest that it is worth investigating the hypothesised relations between work centrality and cultural values in future research, across a larger number of countries. Only then can conclusions be reached regarding relations between specific cultural values and the centrality of work. The national means for the value types, needed to undertake such research, are available in Schwartz (1994b) for 38 nations.[13]

Societal Norms about Working

Consider next relations of cultural value emphases to societal norms that define aspects of the meaning of working. The MOW team discriminated societal norms according to the degree that they emphasise work as a right to which everyone is entitled versus as a duty or obligation that everyone owes to society. An exemplary item is the choice between the following statements: "Every person in our society should be entitled to interesting and meaningful work" versus "A worker should value the work he or she does even if it is boring, dirty or unskilled".

Entitlement norms are based on a view of the person as an equal, autonomous social actor. As noted earlier, this view of the person underlies Autonomy and Egalitarianism values. Obligation norms presume a view of the person as an integral part of the larger collective who is required to behave according to the expectations attached to his or her role. This view of the person underlies Conservatism and Hierarchy values.

The second panel in Table 2 indicates the cultural value emphases hypothesised to be relevant to societal norms about working. Societal norms are expected to define work more as an entitlement where Egalitarianism and Intellectual Autonomy values are especially important. As suggested by the exemplary item, this normative stance views *all* workers as deserving similar outcomes (Egalitarianism), and the work provided is supposed to be interesting and meaningful (Intellectual Autonomy). Societal norms are expected to define work more as an obligation where Conservatism and Hierarchy values are especially important. This normative stance, as suggested by the exemplary item, calls on workers to accept the role obligations imposed on them and to fit into the institutional arrangements provided, regardless of personal satisfactions.

England and Quintanilla (1994) computed an entitlement/obligation index based on responses to four items. This index revealed that the German sample viewed work more as an entitlement (0.73), next were the Japanese

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[13] Means for the additional nations included here will be published in a book in preparation. They can be obtained for specific purposes from the author.

(0.54), and the USA sample viewed work more as an obligation (-0.10). These scores were compared with scores for the mean importance attributed to the cultural values predicted to be compatible with an entitlement norm (Egalitarianism and Intellectual Autonomy) minus those predicted to be compatible with an obligation norm (Conservatism and Hierarchy). The mean differences observed for Germany, Japan, and the USA, respectively, were 1.13, 0.66, and 0.74, for teachers, and 1.30, 0.69, and 0.42, for students.

The order of mean differences is exactly as expected for the student samples. For the teacher samples, Germany showed the largest difference, as expected, but the order for Japan and the USA was reversed. These results, with five of six comparisons in the expected order, lend some plausibility to the hypothesised relations between societal norms about working and the set of cultural values. Testing the specific hypotheses for each cultural value type across a larger number of countries is a task for future research. With a sufficient number of countries in a study, it would be possible to test the statistical significance of the association between national value priorities and societal norms regarding the nature of work.

National Differences in the Importance of Work Values or Goals

Finally, consider relations of cultural value emphases to national differences in the importance of work values or goals. Work values refer to the goals or rewards people seek through their work. They are expressions of more general human values in the context of the work setting. A review of the literature points to four broad types of work values that are distinguished implicitly by respondents (Surkis, 1992). Listed with their core goals in parentheses, these are: intrinsic (personal growth, autonomy, interest, and creativity), extrinsic (pay and security), social (contact with people and contribution to society), power (prestige, authority, influence). My basic contention is that the types of work goals whose pursuit is encouraged and rewarded, rather than discouraged and sanctioned, depend in part on the prevailing cultural value emphases in a society. Moreover, other things being equal, the goals chosen by managers to motivate workers will be more effective if they are compatible with prevailing cultural emphases. That is, no one type of work goal is likely to be the most effective across all cultures.

Given its core goal, each type of work values is more compatible with certain cultural value emphases and less with others. The bottom panel of Table 2 lists cultural value emphases hypothesised to be compatible or in conflict with each of the major types of work values. The pursuit of power values is likely to be more acceptable in cultures where Hierarchy and Mastery values are emphasised (e.g. China, USA in Figs. 3 and 4), and the use of power and prestige to reward workers is likely to be a more effective

motivator. However, the pursuit of these values and their use as motivators is more likely to arouse individual or organised opposition where Harmony and Egalitarianism values are important (e.g. Sweden, Finland).

The pursuit of intrinsic work values is likely to be seen as desirable and justified where Autonomy values are emphasised in a society. People who seek personal growth or opportunities for creativity and autonomy in their work are therefore more likely to find a welcoming cultural climate. In contrast, where Conservatism values are emphasised, people are more likely to be discouraged from pursuing these individuating goals in their work. In like vein, managers are more likely to utilise intrinsic rewards such as opportunities for personal growth, creativity, and autonomy in societies where Autonomy values prevail than in societies characterised by an emphasis on Conservatism values. Moreover, managers are more likely to be effective in motivating workers through appeals to intrinsic work goals in the former than in the latter societies.

Hypotheses regarding the compatibility of or opposition between cultural value emphases and the other two types of work values (extrinsic and social) are also presented in Table 2. To conserve space, I refrain from explicating the relations between the core goals of these types of work values and cultural value emphases that underlie these hypotheses. Given the examples already described, this is a straightforward exercise for the interested reader.

Researchers who wish to understand why particular types of work values are emphasised or downplayed in specific nations can be guided in their research by the hypotheses in Table 2. They can use the cultural value scores of the nations that interest them to test whether the work values emphasised in those nations might be accounted for by the prevailing cultural value emphases. Consider, for example, that we are interested in the use and effectiveness of intrinsic work values in different nations. To simplify, let's say our specific focus is on only two nations, Zimbabwe and Switzerland (French).

According to Table 2, an emphasis on extrinsic work values is hypothesised to be compatible with Conservatism and Hierarchy culture values and to conflict with Intellectual Autonomy values. The location of the samples in both Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 indicate that both the Zimbabwean teacher and student samples gave relatively strong emphasis to Conservatism and Hierarchy values and weak emphasis to Intellectual Autonomy values, whereas the Swiss samples showed the opposite cultural value emphases. If cultural values are associated with and influence individual work values, this suggests that the pursuit of extrinsic work values is more common, and their use as motivators probably more effective, in Zimbabwe than in Switzerland. By using a large number of nations, the hypothesised associations between cultural value emphases and work values could be tested more rigorously.

CONCLUSION

These brief applications of the cultural values approach to the analysis of work centrality, societal norms about working, and work values, are only suggestive of the relevance of this approach for understanding aspects of work. These illustrations can, however, point the way towards utilising what is known about national differences in cultural values for the study of national differences in work-related variables. The approach might fruitfully be exploited, for example, to predict and interpret national differences in such additional areas as: risk-taking and innovation in work; managers' behaviour towards workers; decision-making styles of reliance on own judgement, rules, consultation with superiors or subordinates, etc.; penetration of work involvements into other areas of life.

Figures 3 and 4 provide researchers with information on the value emphases in different nations. This information can be used to sample strategically the countries worth studying in order to test hypotheses regarding the effects of emphases on particular value types. Researchers should sample countries found to range from high to low along the continuum of emphases on the value type of interest. By examining these figures, researchers can also derive the profiles of value emphases on all seven value types that characterise the specific nations they wish to study. In sum, the theory and data presented here provide a new set of conceptual and empirical tools for investigating national differences in work-related as in other variables.

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